SAP ICM
INSERT SAP basis KNOWLEDGE
The so-called SAP message server also belongs to the application layer. Only one instance of this server exists in the system. It mediates between the services and applications. In concrete terms, this means that the message server takes care of load balancing and determines, for example, on which application server a user logs on. Communication between application servers is also the domain of this message server.
Many companies are struggling with the introduction and use of secinfo and reginfo files to secure SAP RFC gateways. We have developed a generator that supports the creation of the files. This blog post lists two SAP best practices for creating the secinfo and reginfo files to enhance the security of your SAP gateway and how the generator helps you do this. secinfo and reginfo Request generator Option 1: Restrictive procedure In the case of the restrictive solution approach, only in-system programmes are allowed. Therefore, external programmes cannot be used. However, since this is desired, the access control lists must be gradually expanded to include each programme required. Although this procedure is very restrictive, which speaks for safety, it has the very great disadvantage that, in the creation phase, links which are actually desired are always blocked. In addition, the permanent manual activation of individual connections represents a continuous effort. For large system landscapes, this procedure is very complex. Option 2: Logging-based approach An alternative to the restrictive procedure is the logging-based approach. To do this, all connections must be allowed first by the secinfo file containing the content USER=* HOST=* TP=* and the reginfo file contains the content TP=*. During the activation of all connections, a recording of all external programme calls and system registrations is made with the gateway logging. The generated log files can then be evaluated and the access control lists created. However, there is also a great deal of work involved here. Especially with large system landscapes, many external programmes are registered and executed, which can result in very large log files. Revising them and creating access control lists can be an unmanageable task. However, this process does not block any intentional connections during the compilation phase, which ensures the system will run non-disruptively.
System Retirement
A BW system often plays a very central role in larger companies. Here the data from the various connected source systems are analysed and reported centrally. A previous customer of mine had a BW system, to which a total of over 20 other SAPP production systems were connected. With such a large and mostly living system landscape, it is normal that individual systems are dismantled from time to time. However, especially with large SAP landscapes, there are strict regulations regarding the permissions of technical RFC users. For this reason, the simple "right-click —> delete" of a source system in RSA1 will often not lead to the target, but rather to a failed permission check. With this blog post, I'll show you a workaround on how to clean a source system from a BW system using the RSAR_LOGICAL_SYSTEM_DELETE and RSAP_BIW_DISCONNECT function blocks.
Of course, SAP administration is carried out by certified and experienced employees. This provides security for the SAP installations as well as for the sometimes quite complex update and upgrade projects.
Tools such as "Shortcut for SAP Systems" are extremely useful in basic administration.
In earlier versions, the database here came from different manufacturers.
In practice, it means taking responsibility for the maintenance environment of the systems, their cooperation, updating, solving user problems and efficiency issues (concerning the network, databases or operating systems), backup copies and architecture.